

# Death, Taxes and Short-Term Underperformance: Emerging Market Funds

*“In this world nothing can be said to be certain, except death and taxes.”<sup>1</sup> —Benjamin Franklin*

Since the Brandes Institute first published its “Death, Taxes and Short-Term Underperformance” pieces more than 10 years ago, they have become a staple among constituents who regularly ask for updates and/or variations on the original theme. While the years have changed since our first study, the overall conclusions from earlier research remain consistent—the best-performing funds had 1- to 3-year stretches when performance was weak relative to their benchmarks and/or peers. But underperformance, even up to three years, had relatively little impact on the best-performing funds’ ability to deliver strong gains over a 10-year period. Ultimately, we believe our research shows it may prove shortsighted to fire good managers when they underperform. To put it a slightly different way, we believe our work underscores the importance of having patience and conviction in managers when many investors seem increasingly focused on shorter-term results.

Of course, our work still does not provide the ever-elusive insights on how to identify the top-performing funds now for the next 10 years. At the same time, in our opinion, good, active managers are characterized by proven investment philosophies, consistent processes and smart people who manage with conviction for the long term. We believe with these traits, managers may be more apt to deliver solid long-term returns.

Stepping back, we took Ben Franklin’s quote above and added a third inevitability (short-term underperformance among active managers) to his famous quip about life’s certainties. The original Death, Taxes and Short-Term Underperformance studies examined a number of asset classes. Here, we revisit our work on international mutual funds. Responding to requests from our constituents, we sought to identify some distinguishing characteristics of top-performing managers, as well as some negative characteristics that distinguish those in the bottom peer ranks. However, our work toward these goals proved inconclusive, as we will describe.

## Investigating Short-Term Underperformance Among Emerging Market Funds

- Identify the top long-term performers
- Reveal their short-term challenges

To investigate actively managed emerging market funds, we applied the same methodology as in previous studies. Using the Morningstar database, we focused on emerging market mutual funds that had at least 10 years of performance data as of June 30, 2017. Multiple share classes, index funds and enhanced index funds were excluded, yielding a sample size of 76 funds.

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### The Sample: 76 Mutual Funds

*From the Morningstar database as of 6/30/17*

1. Actively managed Emerging Market fund mandates
2. 10 years of performance data available
3. Multiple share classes excluded
4. Index funds and enhanced index funds excluded

<sup>1</sup> Source: notable-quotes.com, from a letter to Jean Baptiste LeRoy, 11/13/1789.


Given the limited sample size, the sample was divided into quintiles based on the funds' performance for the entire 10-year period. For example, quintile 1 consisted of the 15 funds with the highest 10-year returns, while the 16 funds with the next-highest returns formed quintile 2, and so on.<sup>2</sup> All mutual fund performance figures assume the reinvestment of interest and capital gains, include the impact of the funds' fees and expenses, and do not include the impact of taxes.

“...the best-performing funds had 1- to 3-year stretches when performance was weak relative to their benchmarks and/or peers.”

Exhibit 1 shows the top 15 mutual funds in the sample posted an annualized gain of at least 3.03% over the 10-year period. All of these “quintile 1” funds outperformed the MSCI Emerging Markets Index (the Index or the benchmark), which returned 1.91% during the decade. There have been numerous studies recently questioning the ability of active managers to outperform respective indices, particularly in more efficient market segments. However, each of the quintile 1 funds delivered at least 112 basis points of outperformance vs. the benchmark on an annualized basis. In addition, all of the funds in quintiles 1 through 2 outperformed the MSCI EM benchmark, which ranked in the median quintile.

**Exhibit 1: The Top Funds Outperformed the Benchmark by More Than 112 Basis Points, Annualized Emerging Markets Funds Ranked by 10-Yr. Annualized Performance, 2007–2017**

**The Quintiles: Emerging Market Funds Ranked by 10-Yr. Annualized Performance, 2007 - 2017**



Source: Morningstar, Brandes Institute; as of 06/30/17. Past performance is not a guarantee of future results. One cannot invest directly in an index.

**Short-Term Snapshots Reveal Dramatic Underperformance vs. Benchmark**

While more than 50% of active emerging market managers beat the benchmark for the 10-year period as a whole, this changes significantly over shorter periods. For the 15 funds in quintile 1, many underperformed the Index by wide margins—with active returns ranging from -0.16% to -33.60% during their worst 1-year rolling periods, as illustrated in Exhibit 2. (On average, these funds trailed the Index by -8.02% in their worst 1-year rolling period.) For most of the funds, the worst 3-year rolling period underperformance versus the Index was also substantial.

<sup>2</sup> Per statistical convention, all quintile contained 15 or 16 funds, except quintile 5, which contained 14.

**Exhibit 2: The Top Funds Underperformed by 802 Basis Points, on Average**

*Top 15 Funds: Relative Performance vs. MSCI EM Index, 2007-2017 (Annualized)*

	Worst 1-Year Rolling Period	Worst 3-Year Rolling Period	Worst 5-Year Rolling Period
Range	-0.16% to -33.60%	2.26% to -18.53%	1.37% to -9.25%
Average	-8.02%	-4.10%	-1.28

Source: Morningstar, Brandes Institute; as of 06/30/17. Past performance is not a guarantee of future results. One cannot invest directly in an index.

The poor relative returns illustrated in Exhibit 2 may have been deemed “unrecoverable” by frustrated investors, prompting them to select another manager. However, abandoning one of these top-performing funds during a streak of poor returns probably would have been a mistake. Our research shows significant short-term underperformance among emerging market equity funds was not unusual, even for those funds that outperformed over the long term. In fact, poor short-term relative returns were common among each of the funds exhibiting the best long-term results. These findings illustrate the importance of looking past short-term performance and focusing on longer-term return potential.

**Underperformance vs. Peers**

In addition to investigating performance relative to the Index, we studied these funds’ performance relative to peers over the decade, ranking them over rolling quarterly, 1-year, 3-year, and 5-year periods. Similar to the pattern exhibited for benchmark-relative returns, the top-performing funds each found themselves in lower quintiles when compared with their peers over shorter periods.

In fact, in terms of quarterly performance, all 15 of the top funds (100%) made at least one below-median appearance (at or below quintile 3) during the decade—and all 15 showed up in the worst quintile (quintile 5) for at least one quarter. When it came to 1-year, 3-year, and 5-year periods, the top 15 funds also experienced underperformance vs. peers, as shown in Exhibit 3. For example, 100% of the funds made at least one appearance in quintiles 3 through 5 for 1-year returns. Looking at 3-year returns, the statistics are slightly better: 87% of the funds ranked in quintile 4 and 5 at some point. But on a 5-year annualized basis, there was marked improvement with many fund performing above median and only a small percentage (13%) in the bottom quintile.

**Exhibit 3: Over 10 Years, All of the Top-Performing Funds Fell Behind At Some Point**

*Percentage of Top 15 Funds With at Least One Appearance at or Below...*

Based on . . .	Quintile 3 ← Underperforming Funds	Quintile 4 Worst-Performing Funds →	Quintile 5
Quarterly Performance	100%	100%	100%
Ann. 1-Year Performance	100%	100%	100%
Ann. 3-Year Performance	13%	87%	87%
Ann. 5-Year Performance	40%	33%	13%

Source: Morningstar, Brandes Institute; as of 06/30/17. Past performance is not a guarantee of future results.

Again, these findings suggest that short-term underperformance relative to peers is to be expected, even for emerging market equity funds that performed well over the long term.

### Characteristics Shared by Outperformers vs. Underperformers?

This study suggests that short-term underperformance, while frustrating, may not necessarily be a cause for alarm over a longer-term horizon. At the request of some of our constituents, we looked for common traits among the best and worst performers. However, based on our analysis, there do not appear to be definitive traits associated with either strong or weak performers. Here are the characteristics we investigated:

- Assets under management
- Manager tenure
- Standard deviation (volatility)
- Expense ratio
- Number of holdings (concentration)
- Tracking error
- Annualized turnover

The results are shown in Exhibit 4. Note, for the top and bottom quintile funds, we show not only the median fund in each quintile, but the range across each quintile for each trait:

Exhibit 4: Top, Bottom and Median Quintile Manager Characteristics (2007-2017)							
	Assets (\$M)	Concentration (# of names)	Manager Tenure (Years)	Tracking Error %	Standard Deviation (Volatility)	Annualized Turnover %	Expense Ratio (I Shares)
Median Top Quintile Manager	\$3,467	105	8.24	5.85	21.94	27	1.30
Range (Low to High)	\$113 to \$32,244	53 to 3881	0.75 to 11.33	4.08 to 14.43	17.30 to 25.09	3 to 232	0.45 to 1.72
Median Manager	\$1,148	109	6.24	5.00	23.39	35	1.24
Median Bottom Quintile Manager	\$353	103	5.21	4.06	23.67	46	1.43
Range (Low to High)	\$9 to \$4,807	52 to 1,125	0.75 to 21.75	2.96 to 8.86	19.96 to 25.41	11 to 155	0.05 to 2.00

Source: Morningstar, Brandes Institute; as of 06/30/17. Past performance is not a guarantee of future results.

For all of these traits, the results were inconclusive, revealing no meaningful relationships. We also wonder about the important distinction between correlation and causation. For example, having more assets under management generally was associated with top performers, but not always. And we ask whether a large asset base was the *cause* of those funds' outperformance or a result of strong returns that attracted new assets. Conversely, lower relative returns may have triggered a decline in assets under management—not vice versa. One could have the same debate about manager tenure. There were other traits where lower figures tended to be better such as turnover and standard deviation, but again, there were meaningful exceptions (noted in the ranges in Exhibit 4) and we would not draw any meaningful conclusions.

One comment about tracking error: lower tracking error for poor performers, as well as the median fund, may suggest that a number of these funds were closet indexers. But before drawing strong conclusions, we suggest a closer investigation of these funds, including a thorough holdings-based analysis.

### Short-Term Underperformance as Normal as Death and Taxes

Overall, whether relative to a benchmark or peers, short-term performance can be frustrating. However, this updated study again illustrated that it may not necessarily be a cause for alarm. Poor results may be an

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inherent byproduct of the investment process that is behind a successful longer-term record. Unfortunately, we were unable to pinpoint specific traits that were consistent across the best (or worst) performing funds during our study period.

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such as one quarter, one year, and perhaps even a few years—can be a normal part of the investment experience, even for funds that perform well over longer periods. In our opinion, investors who keep this in mind may be better positioned for long-term success.

Ultimately, we believe this brief study's key point remains: underperformance in shorter periods—

## Disclosures

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Rolling periods represent a series of overlapping, smaller time periods within a single, longer-term time period. For example, over a 20-year period, there is one 20-year rolling period, eleven 10-year rolling periods, sixteen 5-year rolling periods, and so forth.

Morningstar, Inc. is an independent mutual fund research and rating service.

Basis point: 1/100 of 1%.

Standard deviation: Dispersion of a data set from its mean.

Tracking error: Standard deviation of the difference between a portfolio's return and its benchmark's return.

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